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Had the defendant's counsel made proper objection and had the court ruled the
plea of guilty inadmissible, the prosecution could have introduced testimony as to the
defendant's statements before the justice.1S The statement of the defendant that he
wrote the check would be let in as an admission,' 6 which the defendant could have
explained." The prosecutor's burden, however, is increased if the docket itself is not
admissible; in the present case the justice of the peace could not be called, having
died pending suit in the district court.
But since the defendant's counsel did not object to the admission of the docket it
seems that the defendant waived his right to keep the plea of guilty from the jury. 8
The prejudicial effect of this evidence is not so great that an appellate court will hold
that the trial court should have excluded it on its own motion and that failure to do so
constitutes reversible error."9 That failure to exclude such evidence does not result in
an unfair trial is borne out by the fact that some courts allow the introduction of a
withdrawn plea of guilty.20
The docket, a copy of which was introduced by the state, was not signed by the
justice of the peace who heard the case. The authenticity of the copy was certified by
his successor in office, but no one certified the accuracy of the original. There being no
clerk of court, it would seem that only the presiding justice could certify that the
record faithfully represented that which actually occurred before him." Lacking such
certification, the docket was inadmissible hearsay,'2 and the copy was secondary hearsay, likewise inadmissible. But since no objection to its admission was made, the defendant waived the right to have the evidence excluded.23 Admission without objection does not constitute reversible error.24
Federal Courts-Procedure-Jurisdiction of Federal Courts to Render Declaratory
Judgments in State Tax Cases-[Federal].-The plaintiff, a taxpayer, sued in a federal district court to obtain a declaratory judgment that the Wyoming Emergency
Sales Tax Act of 1935' and Use Tax Act of 19372 were unconstitutional. The state con'5 Any person present in the justice's court could testify as to what occurred therein, and
this method of proving the defendant's statements before the justice would have given the defendant an opportunity to cross-examine the witness giving the testimony.
64 Wigmore, Evidence § 1059 (3d ed. 294o).

7TIbid.; Commonwealth v. Bennett, iio Pa. Super. 3o3, i68 AUt. 499 (z933); Yeska v.
Swendrzynski, 133 Wis. 475, 113 N.W. 959 (1907).
is 1 Wigmore, Evidence § i8 (3d ed. 1946); see Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 450
(1912).

9 See and compare the following with the present case: People v. Dean, 253 Mich. 434, 235
211 (i931) (evidence of similar acts); State v. Fixley, xi8 Kan. I, 233 Pac. 796 (1925)
(evidence of bloodhound's trail); Perara v. United States, 235 Fed. 5,5 (C.C.A. 8th i916)
(judge's comment on character evidence).
20 People v. Steinmetz, 24o N.Y. 411, 148 N.E. 597 (1925); State v. Carta, go Conn. 79, 96
At. 41x (2926).
"'7Wigmore, Evidence § 2164 (3d ed. 1940).
-Moore v. State, 51 Ark. i3o, 10 S.W. 22 (i888); Bridge v. Branam, 133 Ind. 488, 33 N.E.

N.W.

271 (1893).
23Note i8 supra.

24 Note

x8 supra.

'Wyo. L. 74 (I935)
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Wyo. L. 118 (1937).
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tended that the amendment to Section 24 of the Judicial Code of the United States,3
which provides that no district court shall have jurisdiction to "enjoin, suspend or restrain .... collection of any tax imposed by ....any state where a plain, speedy and
efficient remedy may be had at law or in equity in .... such state," deprived the federal courts of jurisdiction to grant even declaratory relief in tax cases. Held, inter alia,
that the amendment to Section 24 of the judicial Code does not limit the jurisdiction
of federal courts in actions for declaratory judgments. Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. State
Board of Equalization of WyoMilig.4
In a recent cases a federal district court in New York held that the words "enjoin,
suspend or restrain" as used in the amendment to Section 24 of the judicial Code 6 proscribed declaratory as well as injunctive relief. The court stated that Congress by the
amendment sought to protect state revenue agencies against interference by the federal judiciary, and that the amendment is concerned with the effect and not merely the
form of judicial action.7 It was further said that since judicial decisions are usually respected, a declaratory judgment, like an injunction, operates to "restrain" collection
of a tax.8
In the instant case the court stated that declaratory relief is sui generis9 in that a
mere declaratory judgment carries no coercive sanction and is effectuated only through
the voluntary compliance of the parties and, therefore, is not comprehended by the
amendment, which in terms bars only injunctive relief.xo The decision serves to illustrate the attitude of the judiciary toward Congressional legislation which has from
time to time attempted to limit the jurisdiction of the federal courts with respect to
tax matters.
In 1867 Congress denied jurisdiction to any court to "restrain" the collection of federal taxes.xx Regarded at first as an absolute prohibition against the granting of in5o Stat. 738 (z937), 28 U.S.C.A. § 41(l) (Supp. 294o), amending Rev. Stat. §§ 563, 629
(1875).
4 35 F. Supp. 553 (Wyo. 1940).

5 Collier Advertising Service v. New York City, 32 F. Supp. 87o (N.Y. 1946).
650 Stat. 738 (1937), 28 U.S.C.A. § 41(1) (Supp. i94o), amending Rev. Stat. §§ 563, 629
(1875).

Collier Advertising Service v. New York City, 32 F. Supp. 870, 872 (N.Y. 194o).
Ibid., at 872; Socony Vacuum Oil Co. v. New York City, 247 App. Div. 63, 168, 287
N.Y.Supp. 288,293-94(1936) (injunctive relief unnecessary); Borchard, DeclaratoryJudgments
172 (1934). It appears that tax authorities hestitate to collect a tax pending appeal even when
declaratory relief has been denied. Nashville, Chattanooga & St. L. R. Co. v. Wallace, 288
7

8

U.S.

249

(1933); Collier Advertising Service v. New York City, 32 F. Supp. 870 (1940);

cf. Beeland Wholesale Co. v. Davis, 88 F. (2d) 447 (C.C.A. 5 th 1937).
9Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 35 F. Supp. 553, 554 (WVyo. 294o);
cf. United States Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Koch, 1o2 F. (2d) 288, 290 (C.C.A. 3d 1939);
Borchard, Declaratory Judgments 138, 172 (1934).

- Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 35 F. Supp. 553, 554 (Wyo.
Penn v. Glenn, io F. Supp. 483, 486-87 (Ky. 2935), which similarly construed the act

294o);

of 1867, Rev. Stat. § 3224 (2875), 26 U.S.C.A. § 3653 (1940). See note ii infra.

"1The act provided, "No suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of
any tax shall be maintained in any court." Rev. Stat. § 3224 (1875); 26 U.S.C.A. § 3653
(294o). This section was construed to apply to federal taxes only. State Railway Tax Cases,
92

U.S. 575, 613 (1875); Snyder v. Marks, 109 U.S. 189, 193 (1883).
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junctive relief, 2 the statute was subsequently construed as permitting the issuance of
injunctions in unusual and extraordinary situations.3 Until the constitutionality of
the declaratory judgment was clearly recognized by the Supreme Court in 1933,'4 the
question of the applicability of the act of 1867 to this type of relief was not raised.
After the passage of the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act,is a district court held that6
the act of 1867 did not preclude the granting of declaratory relief in a federal tax case.
The declaratory judgment act was hastily amended7 in order to prevent judicial interference through declaratory relief with the collection of federal taxes. In the I937
amendment to Section 24 of the Judicial Code 8 Congress extended to state taxing
agencies the same privileges against interference by the federal courts which had been
accorded to federal taxing agencies under the act of i867.'9 The reasons for this amendment 2o may be found in the overburdened dockets of the federal courts,2' the greater
familiarity of state courts with local problems, 2 the desirability of permitting state
courts to construe their own statutes in the first instance,2 and the greater expense to
24
the parties (including the state agencies) of litigation in the federal courts.
One indication that the amendment was not intended completely to exclude federal
2State Railway Tax Cases, 92 U.S. 575 (1875).
The dictum of the court in Dodge v. Brady, 240 U.S. 122 (I916), was adopted as the
rationale of decision in Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44 (922). An exception was also created in
favor of penalty taxes. Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U.S. 557 (2922); Regal Drug Co. v. Wardell,
260 U.S. 386 (1922).
'4Nashville, Chattanooga & St. L. R. Co. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249 (1933); Borchard,
Declaratory Judgments 271 et seq. (1934).
'-548 Stat. 955 (1934), 28 U.S.C.A. § 4oo (Supp. i94o).
16Penn v. Glenn, io F. Supp. 483 (Ky. 2935).
23

2749 Stat. 2027 (1935), 28 U.S.C.A. § 400 (Supp. i94o), amending Federal Declaratory
Judgment Act, 48 Stat. 955 (1934).
's 50 Stat. 738 (1937), 28 U.S.C.A. § 41(l) (Supp. i94o), amending Rev. Stat. §§ 563, 629
(1875).
'9 Rev. Stat. § 3224 (1875), 26 U.S.C.A. § 3653 (2940). Similar protection was accorded
to state rate-making agencies by the Johnson Act, 48 Stat. 775 (2934), 28 U.S.C.A. § 41(2)
(Supp. 294o), amending Rev. Stat. §§ 563, 629 (,875). The judicially-created exceptions rapidly appeared. Mississippi Power Co. v. Aberdeen, ii F. Supp. 95x (Miss. 1935); Mountain
States Power Co. v. Public Service Com'n, 299 U.S. 167 (1936); Cary v. Corp. Com'n, 9 F.
Supp. 709 (Okla. 1935), aff'd 296 U.S. 452 (x935); The Johnson Act: Defining a "Plain, Speedy,
and Efficient" Remedy in the States Courts, 5o Harv. L. Rev. 813 (1937).
20 This amendment is a further development of the policy which was evidenced by the
passage of the Johnson Act, 8i Cong. Rec. 2415 (2937). Senator Bone's report on this amendment is based largely upon the committee report on the Johnson Act. See the committee
report on the Johnson Act, S. Rep. 125, 73d Cong. ist Sess. (I933); The Johnson Act-A
Return to State Independence, 3 o Ill. L. Rev. 225, 216 (1935). See also Wideman, Application
of the Declaratory Judgment Act to Tax Suits, 23 Tax Mag. 539 (1935); 35 Mich. L. Rev.
274(1936).
2181 Cong. Rec. 1415 (1937).
- 81 Cong. Rec. 1415 (1937); Lockwood, Maw and Rosenberry, The Use of the Federal
Injunction in Constitutional Litigation, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 426, 449 (2930).
23
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241bid.

RECENT CASES
district courts from determining controversies with respect to state taxes is that the
district courts have in the past considered themselves as having jurisdiction over taxpayer suits for refunds of state taxes. The amendment contains no language terminating this jurisdiction. Suits for refunds of state taxes, however, have seldom been
brought in the federal courts. Furthermore, state legislation providing that suits to
recover taxes may be brought exclusively in the state courts has been upheld where
the remedy provided has been considered adequate. Where constitutional issues are
raised an appeal may be taken from the state courts to the Supreme Court of the United States,2s but this procedure does not affect the relation of the district courts to matters of state taxation.
Since the amendment does not specifically refer to declaratory relief, a negative inference may be drawn. 6 It may be argued that when drafting the amendment to Section 24 of the Judicial Code, Congress was aware that the courts had interpreted the
act of x867 as permitting declaratory relief in federal tax cases, 27 that an amendment
to the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act had been necessary to prevent this type of interference,28 and that declaratory relief had been granted in state tax cases.2 9 Consequently, it may be contended that by the use of language in the '937 amendment similar to that of the act of 1867 Congress intended to continue to permit the federal courts
to grant declaratory relief when state taxes were in issue.30 It may also be suggested
that if Congress had intended to prevent declaratory relief in state tax cases it would
have done so explicitly when it proscribed declaratory relief in federal tax cases in the
1935 amendment to the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act.3x Failure to do so is explained, however, by the absence of any legislative policy to limit even injunctive relief
in the federal courts in state tax cases until 1937 and the absence of any case prior to
1935 in which a federal court granted declaratory relief when state taxes were in issue.
23 Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436 (igoo); Burrill v. Locomobile Co., 258 U.S. 34 (1922).
Where administrative remedies are provided the federal courts may refuse to consider the
case until these remedies have been exhausted. The Wyoming statutes, Wyo. L. 74 (x935),
Wyo. L. 118 (1937), provided for a hearing before the Board of Equalization and an appeal
from the decision of the board to the district court and to the supreme court of the state.
26There are other indications, however, that declaratory relief cannot be granted. The
record states that the "object of the legislation .... is to take away jurisdiction from the district courts ..... " 81 Cong. Rec. 1415, 1417 (1937). It has been held that the federal courts
do not have jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief under the Johnson Act. Mississippi Power
& Light Co. v. Jackson, 9 F. Supp. 564 (Miss. 1935). Professor Moore approves a similar construction of the 1937 amendment. 3 Moore and Friedman, Federal Practice § 57.03 (1938).
The Johnson Act-A Return to State Independence, 30 Ill.
L. Rev. 215, 226 (1935).
27 Penn v. Glenn, ioF. Supp. 483 (Ky. 1935).
2849 Stat. 1027 (1935), 28 U.S.C.A. §400 (Supp. z94o), amending Federal Declaratory
Judgment Act, 48 Stat. 955 (1934).
29 Gully v. Interstate Natural Gas Co., 82 F. (2d) 145 (C.C.A.
5 th 1936), cert. den. 298 U.S.
688 (1936).
30After a federal district court declared the AAA unconstitutional in Black v. Little, 8 F.
Supp. 867 (Mich. 1934), Congress expressly prohibited the granting of declaratory as well as
injunctive relief in cases involving the taxing portion of the act. 49 Stat. 770 (i935),7 U.S.C.A.
§ 623 (1939).
3149 Stat. 1027 (Y935), 28 U.S.C.A. § 400, (Supp. 294o), amending Federal Declaratory
Judgment Act, 48 Stat. 955 (1934).
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Although jurisdiction to grant declaratory judgments in state tax cases may be found
to exist, the present Congressional policy against permitting undue interference with
both state and federal taxing agencies would dictate that the highly discretionary
power32 to grant declaratory relief should be exercised only under unusual circumstances. If such restraint is not practiced, another amendment to the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act may be forthcoming.
Guardian and Ward-Insanity Proceedings-Power of Judge to Appoint Guardian
ad Litem in Hearing to Determine Competency of Prisoner -[New York].-Pursuant
to a statute an inmate of a woman's detention house was transferred to an asylum for
mental defectives on the authorization of the prison physician and two competent examiners.' At the expiration of the penal sentence, the superintendent of the asylum
applied in accordance with another statute to the local county court for authorization
to detain the inmate because she was still mentally defective.2 The latter statute provided that the county judge should select two qualified examiners, including at least
one psychologist, to determine the mental competency of the prisoner, and that he
should issue a detention order if satisfied that the prisoner is incompetent. In the present case the judge appointed a guardian ad litem for the prisoner and directed the
asylum to pay the guardian's fee. The appellate division upheld the order of the county judge.3 On appeal to the court of appeals, held, that the county judge had power
neither to appoint a guardian ad litem nor to direct payment of his fee. Order reversed.
Matter of Naylor.4
Had the present proceeding been one to pr6cure the original confinement of a person alleged to be mentally incompetent, the judge could have appointed a guardian ad
litem. Authority is expressly granted by statute in New Yorks and in most other states.
6
But it is not dear whether American courts possess this power apart from statute.
Under English common law the custody and control of the person and property of lunatics and idiots were in the Crown, which delegated the jurisdiction to the chancellor.7
32 Cf. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Koch, 102 F. (2d) 288, 294 (C.C.A. 3d
1939); Automotive Equipment Co. v. Trico Products Corp., ii F. Supp. 292, 295 (N.Y.
I935); Borchard, Declaratory Judgments 99 et seq. (1934).
1N.Y. Cons. Laws (McKinney, Supp. 1940) c. 43, §§ 438, 439.
2 N.Y. Cons. Laws (McKinney, 1929) c. 43, § 44o; N.Y. Cons. Laws (McKinney, Supp.
1940) c. 43, § 45I.

Matter of Naylor, 259 App. Div. 962, 2o N.Y.S. (2d) 4 (1940).
284 N.Y. i88, 3° N.E. (2d) 468 (I94O).
s N.Y. Civ. Prac. Ann. (Gilbert-Bliss, 1926) § 207.
6 Grinnell, A Suggested Rule for the Consideration of the Supreme Judicial and Probate
Courts in Regard to Guardians ad Litem, 23 Mass. L. Q., No. 3, at io, 13 (1938); Chase v.
3
4

Chase, 216 Mass. 394, 397, 103 N.E. 857, 859 (i924). But for the opposite view see Madden,
Persons and Domestic Relations § 233 (i93i); Singer and Krohn, Insanity and the Law 223
(1924).

Wharton and Still6, Medical Jurisprudence 485 (5th ed. 1905); i Collinson, Lunacy 87
Singer and Krohn, Insanity and the Law 222 (1924). The statute of De Prerogativ&
Regis (1324) recognizes this jurisdiction, "The king shall have custody of the land of natural
fools, taking the profits of them without waste or destruction, and shall find for them their
necessaries .......
7i

(x812);

